Governance and Financing of Chinese Higher Education by Wang, Chengzhi
1 of 19
 
Education Policy Analysis Archives
Volume 8 Number 26 June 5, 2000 ISSN 1068-2341
A peer-reviewed scholarly electronic journal
Editor: Gene V Glass, College of Education
Arizona State University
Copyright 2000, the EDUCATION POLICY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES.
Permission is hereby granted to copy any article 
if EPAA is credited and copies are not sold.
Articles appearing in EPAA are abstracted in the Current 
Index to Journals in Education by the ERIC Clearinghouse 
on Assessment and Evaluation and are permanently archived 
in Resources in Education. 
From Manpower Supply to Economic Revival:
Governance and Financing of Chinese Higher Education
Chengzhi Wang
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Abstract
With an introduction to the overall underdevelopment of higher
education in China compared with the American counterpart, this article
briefly examines the main trends of over two decades of development of
the governance and financing systems of China's higher education sector.
This article analyzes the resource allocation from governments and
revenue generation in institutions under the reform policies of
administrative decentralization and financing diversification. The new
"Great Leap Forward" in higher education in 1999 and beyond, i.e., the
radical and, to a certain extent, desperate mass higher education policy
and practice of expanding enrollments in order to spur domestic
consumption, is critically analyzed. By examining the ongoing
institutional merging and "co-building" and the most recent enrollment
expansion, the writer points out the economic significance for higher
education of overcoming diseconomies of scale and inefficiencies.
However, the long-range outcomes of the seemingly exciting investment
in and consumption of mass higher education are difficult to predict.
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Introduction
The significant issues such as reform, privatization, access, efficiency, equality, and
equity are closely related to Chinese higher education administration and financing
systems that are experiencing radical changes and restructuring2. (Note 2) In this article, 
I try to make a brief macro analysis of the case of Chinese higher education in the reform
era from 1978 until the present primarily from the perspectives of governance and
financing. From meeting modernization manpower requirements and producing
technically qualified and politically correct human resources for about two decades,
higher education in China now orients itself to stimulating investment and consumption,
primarily on the demand side, in order to help the state revive the slumping economy.
First, I introduce Chinese higher education by comparing it with the well-known practice
(e.g., long history, large scale, and high-level development) of American higher
education. Second, I examine the main policy shifts of a more than two-decade
development and general governance and financing operations in higher education.
Third, I analyze the resource allocations of governments and revenue generation of
institutions under reform policies of administrative decentralization and financing
diversification. Fourth, I critically introduce and analyze the recent appearance of radical
policy and practice to expand enrollment. Through stimulating the nationwide family
investment and consumption of higher education, the state decision-makers hope that the
move of mass higher education will help reinvigorate domestic consumption and help
regain the state's sustained economic growth. In conclusion, by reflecting on institutional
merging and "co-building" and the most recent radical enrollment expansion, I
emphasize the economic ramifications of overcoming diseconomies of scale and
inefficiencies of higher education for the development of Chinese economy. Meanwhile,
I point out the results of the ongoing radical policies and practices of mass higher
education remain very difficult to predict.
Overall Underdevelopment
For about two decades since the late 1970s, higher education in China has been
experiencing tremendous changes and reforms. The reforms such as policy shifts toward
decentralization of administration and diversification of financing have resulted in a
great development in a number of fronts in the higher education sector. The rapid
expansion in enrollments, reported to have increased to about 10 percent (Plafker, 1999)
at the end of the century, was hailed as transition toward mass higher education
(Hayhoe, 1993)3. (Note 3) However, compared with the general practice in the
American higher education system4, (Note 4) the first impression of the Chinese higher
education system appears, among others, small in scale, short in history, and immature
in development. 
There were only 1,000 public regular colleges and universities in China, with a total
enrollment of less than four million before 1999, which is the start of what I call the new
"Great Leap Forward" in higher education when the enrollment ratio reached 10 percent.
According to most recent Chinese official statistics, the number of these public
institutions with an enrollment of 5,000 or more is less than one-seventh (CSSB, 1996,
pp. 112-113). The average enrollment increased from 2,927 in 1996 to 3,112 in 1997
(CEY Editorial Board, 1998). Obviously, there exist diseconomies of scale in the higher
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education sector. 
In terms of history, the first university (now Peking University) in the modern sense was
established in 1898. After that, sociopolitical instability and turbulence in China in the
first half of twentieth century largely precluded serious development of higher
education5. (Note 5) After the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, the higher
education sector, though it soon gained great development under strong influence of the
Soviet model, was nearly abolished during the most radical years of Cultural Revolution
(1966-1976) (Cleverly, 1985; Lofstedt, 1980). After 1978, the American model of higher
education was the one copied in China (Pepper, 1996).
Still in a stage of immature development, the higher education system in China is now
more likely to be hyperpoliticized and ideologized even in the reform era. The typical
examples are the nationwide compulsory three-month- to-one-year military education for
students in colleges and universities in the years after the 1989 student movement and
the alleged school-organized student demonstration after the NATO bombing of the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999. In addition, still struggling to grow out of the
political control and command plan, higher education institutions are not well prepared
for either the opportunities or the challenges of the free market. Besides, most
institutions do not have clearly defined missions, performance-based management, or
financing mechanisms. Few institutions have long-range institutional development
goals. Internal and external inefficiencies and resource waste are still prevalent.
Furthermore, after the policy of tuition and fees was applied in all public regular
institution in 1996, effective and adequate financial aids from governments are generally
unavailable, nor is the perfect market available where students and parents of poor
families can obtain loans to invest in higher education. It is very difficult for students
from poor families to obtain equal higher educational opportunities. 
Compared with the fully developed American counterpart, higher education in China, to
a certain extent, is still fumbling toward institutional autonomy, academic independence,
and professional development. Chinese higher education institutions are making efforts
to overcome inefficiencies, inequities, and underdevelopment (World Bank, 1997)
through, for example, obtaining World Bank loans and following its recommendations.
The new "Great Leap Forward" in the enrollment expansion in 1999 is the radical move
that the policy decision-makers deem as a new way to develop higher education and,
more importantly, to help revive the nation's economy (Note 6).
Development Trends
It is known that social and private benefits and monetary and non-monetary returns help
drive the development of higher education (McMahon, 1974; Leslie & Brinkman, 1994).
In addition, politicization of education has a special role in Chinese educational
development, which is marked by hyper-politicization, politicization, and
de-politicization at different periods of time (Sautman, 1991). Social and private benefits
and monetary and non-monetary returns are also the driving forces for higher education
development in China. In the reform of the 1980s, however, the state's manpower
requirements for modernization and the pressure for international parity were among the
immediate driving forces to expand, reform, and develop higher education. 
Since the new state development policies of reform and "opening to outside world" were
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implemented in 1978, the Chinese government has placed top priority on education, in
particular on higher education in order to produce urgently needed skills and talents for
economic reform and national modernization. Two major measures were taken in the
higher education sector to achieve these goals: enrollment enlargement and institutional
multiplication. 
The period between 1978 and 1985 witnessed a rapid growth in the number of
enrollments and institutions (Table 1). Most of the growth in the number of institutions
occurred between 1982 and 1985. The total number of institutions grew from 715 in
1982 to 1,016 in 1985 (Cheng, 1993, pp. 201-214). In 1985, the central government
promulgated the "Resolution on Education Reform," which became the Education Act in
1996, initiating sweeping reform in all education sectors including higher education. In
1993, to speed up the reform and transformation from a planned economy to a market
economy, the central government enacted new policy guidelines, namely "Guidelines of
Chinese Educational Reform and Development." These new legislation and policies
advocated decentralization of institutional administration and management, and
diversification of educational financing while the central and upper level governments
maintained managerial oversight and policy regulation (Lewin et al., 1994). 
Reforms in the higher education sector after 1985 featured a rapid increase in
enrollments and with a growing effort to participate in market economy, rationalize
specializations, and restructure curriculum and instruction, among others. But the total
number of institutions did not increase significantly. In addition, the higher education
sector has since been evidencing Westernization and globalization. The American model
of a higher education system is gradually replacing the Soviet model for Chinese
colleges and universities (Pepper, 1996). 
Table 1
Development in Institutions and Enrollments, 1977-2000
Year Institutions FTE Enrollments
a 
(In millions)
Annual Increase
(In thousands)
2000 <1,020 >4.90 >331
1999 <1,020 4.50 >=331
1998 1,020 3.41 58
1997 1,020 3.35 167
1996 1,032 3.18 115
1995 1,064 3.05 120
1994 1,080 2.93 290
1993 1,065 2.64 360
1992 1,053 2.28 150
1991 1,064 2.13 -30
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1990b 1,075 2.16 -20
1989 1,075 2.18 0
1988 1,075 2.18 100
1987 1,063 2.08 90
1986 1,054 1.99 200
1985 1,016 1.79 340
1984 902 1.45 140
1983 805 1.31 130
1982 715 1.18 -120
1981 704 1.30 130
1980 675 1.17 130
1979 633 1.04 173
1978 598 0.86 242
1977c 404 0.63
Note. From Asian Times (1999); CEY Editorial Board (1997; 1998); Ministry of
Education (MOE) Department of Development and Planning (1998); China State
Statistic Bureau, Education Statistics Yearbook of China, 1992-1995; World Bank
(1997); Zhao (1995).
a
 FTE Enrollments in associate, bachelor and graduate degree programs. Inconsistent
statistics may be found in different official Chinese sources.
b
 1990 and 1991 enrollments shrank from previous years probably because of the
negative enrollment policy in response to the 1989 nationwide student movements.
c
 The Higher Education Entrance Examination System, which was abolished for several
years during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), was reinstated in 1977.
As reported in Table 1, public regular higher education institutions increased to 1,080 in
1994. In 1995, the number of institutions decreased to 1,054. In 1996, 1997, and 1998,
the numbers of regular public colleges and universities are 1,032, 1,020, and 1,020,
respectively. According to Zhao (1995), the ongoing remarkable trend of institutional
merging and amalgamation and establishment of cross- institutional consortia has
resulted in a decrease in the total number of institutions. The merging trend in Chinese
higher education is in sharp contrast with difficulties in institutional merging in the
United States. In 1997, 162 colleges and universities merged into 74 institutions (CEY
Editorial Board, 1998). Zhao (1998) explored institutional merging and amalgamation as
a remarkable aspect of restructuring Chinese higher education, but could not adequately
explore this phenomenon. The merging and amalgamation actually were accompanied
and facilitated by policies that upgraded institution's rankings in the higher education
hierarchy and increased their share of resources. In addition, institutional merger and
amalgamation were the only option other than closure for institutions owned by several
central ministry-level departments that were cut off during Premier Zhu Rongji's bold
governmental restructuring and downsizing in 1998. The merging is still going on, and I
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believe it will further reduce the numbers of colleges and universities. 
In 1999, the central government decided to increase enrollment by 44 percent over the
previous year (Liaowang News Weekly, 1999, p. 33), making the enrollment incidence
as high as 10 percent for the first time in Chinese history. It was hoped that this radical
enrollment expansion would satisfy the longstanding high demand for college education
by families and students. More importantly, after many other attempts to revive the
national economy proved unsatisfactory, decision makers hoped that the expected
large-scale consumption and investment in higher education by households would
stimulate domestic economic development (Plafker, 1999). Enrollments will continue to
increase by 300,000 or more each year beyond 1999 according to the education
authorities (Asian Times, 1999). Thus, the average unit cost in higher education is
expected to be lower with the production of a larger volume of graduates, services, and
research. Economies of scale in Chinese higher education sector are being sought.
Governance and Financing Systems
Higher education institutions are vertically administered and financed by one of the three
types of administrative authority: (a) The MOE (Ministry of Education, which was
renamed the SEC, State Education Commission in 1985, and renamed MOE in 1998),
(b) the non-education ministry-level departments in the central government, and (c)
provinces and province-level municipalities. The institutions of MOE and the central
ministry-level governments are funded with budgetary allocations from the Ministry of
Finance through MOE. Generally, the financial allocations are based simply on
head-count enrollments, plus irregular, special-purpose funding. The provincial
institutions are funded by the department of finance in each province and province-level
municipality through MOE's provincial branches, plus irregular "encouraging" funding
from the central government.
In 1995, there were 36 national "keypoint" universities funded through the SEC, with
enrollments accounting for 11 percent of the total (Table 2). The average size was about
6,680 students. There were 331 ministry-funded institutions with enrollment taking 34
percent of the total. The average size was only about 2,100 students. There were 687
provincial and municipal institutions with enrollments of 55 percent of the total. The
average size was about 1,600 students. In 1997, the average enrollment size of the three
types of higher education institution grew to 3,112. All of the colleges and universities
(except for a few recent amalgamated ones such as the Zhejiang University and the
Sichuan Union University) are similar to very small U.S. colleges, according to
American higher education enrollment numbers. But because of their diseconomies of
scale, excessive high unit costs, ineffective organization structures, mismanagement,
high student subsidies, and limited revenue sources (Hartnett, 1993), Chinese colleges
and universities lack the economic efficiency, academic vitality, professional
development, affirmative action, and democratic participation apparent in colleges and
universities in the U.S.A.
Table 2
Number and Enrollment in Regular Colleges and Universities, 1995 
(Enrollment in 1,000)
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# 
Institutions
Undergrad.
enrollm.
Short-cycle
enrollm.
Total 
enrollm.
Undergrad.
enrollm.
Total
enrollm.
SEC/MOE 36 223 47 269 15% 11%
Central 
Ministries 331 629 328 956 41% 34%
Provincial
or 
municipal
authorities
687 666 907 1573 44% 55%
Totals 1054 1518 1282 2799 100% 100%
Note. From China State Statistics Bureau (1996, pp. 112-123) and World Bank (1997),
with the author's modification.
Of the total enrollments in these public regular institutions, 52 percent were enrolled in
degree-earning undergraduate studies, 44 percent in short-cycle (associate degree)
programs, and 4 percent in postgraduate studies in 1995. These institutions employed
1.04 million staff, of whom 38 percent were faculty, 44 percent were administrative and
supportive staff, and 18 percent were employed in organizations and companies
affiliated with the institutions. Of the total faculty and staff, only 2 percent had a
doctoral degree, 19 percent a master's degree, 49 percent a bachelor's degree, and 30
percent held short- cycled diplomas or equivalent educational attainment (World Bank,
1997, p. xiii). 
In 1997, the total enrollments in colleges and universities reached 3.35 million. The
higher education sector employed 1.0315 million staff, of whom 405,000 people, about
40 percent were faculty, all others were administrative and supportive staff, and
employees in organizations and companies affiliated with the institutions (CEY Editorial
Board, 1998). The number of faculty is slowly increasing while the number of
administrative staff is decreasing. Despite the fact that student numbers in both regular
public and adult higher education institutions were included, the officially published
student-faculty ratio increased from only 8.91:1 in 1995 to 9.81:1 in 1997 (CEY
Editorial Board, 1997, 1998).
It should be pointed out that some central ministries, for instance the Ministry of Finance
and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, are more powerful and
richly funded than other ministry-level departments. Some provinces and municipalities,
in particular those in the east and south coastal regions, are much more economically
developed than those in the hinterland. Consequently, there exist inequalities in
allocation of financial resources among institutions from the three types of authority.
In recent years, in order to mobilize resources to better manage and finance institutions
and improve institutions' internal and external efficiencies, MOE has encouraged
gongjian ("co-building") colleges and universities in collaboration with provincial and
municipal governments and/or industry. Collaborations between MOE and other
ministries, between MOE and provinces, between universities and corporations, and
among different institutions have been increasing greatly in hopes of achieving better
management and financing of colleges and universities. In 1997, 100 universities had
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officially announced their "co-building" partners ranging from provincial governments,
and central level ministries to corporations. In all, 228 colleges and universities had
signed official collaborative contracts with "cooperators" and "partners" including
provincial governments, central ministry-level departments, and other institutions. For
instance, a total of 129 employers and organizations participated in the "co- building" of,
or in cooperation with, the Inner Mongolian University in north China (CEY Editorial
Board, 1998, pp. 155-180)
Resources Allocation and Generation
China has experienced sustained economic growth for about two decades in the reform
era since 1978, with an impressive average growth rate of about 9 percent per year in
real terms. In recent years, economic growth has slowed because of multiple reasons.
Given domestic economic growth and the perceived international parity, spending on
education in China is a mixed picture. Great progress has been achieved but there is
great room to improve.
Because a market economy gradually replaced the rigid centralized planning, and
localities and employers could retain much of their earnings without including them for
taxes, the growth of government revenues fell far behind that of GDP, increasing at an
annual average of only 2.6% (World Bank, 1997). However, government expenditures
increased at 3.3% per year higher than revenue, resulting in budget deficits almost every
year. Public expenditure on education increased by an annual average of 10 percent
between 1978 and 1994, far exceeding the growth rates of the total government revenues
and expenditures. Though overall public spending decreased over the years, public
spending on education in proportion to total government spending rose from 6.2 percent
in 1978 to 17 percent in 1994 (World Bank, 1997), and stayed about 16 percent during
1995-1997. Yet, public spending as a percentage of GDP rose from 2.1 percent in 1978
up to 3.1 percent in 1989, fell to 2.2 percent in 1994, and gradually fell to 2.47 percent in
1996, and then rose to 2.54 percent in 1997 (MOE Department of Development and
Planning, 1998). This level of spending is very low in comparison with the average of
2.8 percent of least- developed countries, 4.1 percent of developing countries, and 5.3
percent of developed countries (UNESCO, 1995, pp. 2- 28). Some researchers have
criticized this low level of public spending from international parity (Tsang, 1994).
Spending on education as a percentage of GDP would probably be slightly larger if the
community's support for education at village and township levels were taken into
account. It is very hard to calculate the nationwide local and community contribution
and investment in education in both physical and financial resources. 
The public allocation to higher education grew by an annual average of 9.7 percent
between 1978 and 1994. Public spending on higher education rose from 20 percent of
the total expenditure on education in 1978 up to 29 percent in 1984, then fell to about 17
percent between 1989 and 1992, and rose to 19 percent in 1994. The budgeted public
allocation accounted for 95.9 percent in 1978, 86.9 percent in 1990 and 81.8 percent of
the total revenues in the higher education sector in 1992 (Table 3). Given a very low
enrollment ratio in higher education, pubic spending in higher education was high in
comparison with its Asian neighbor countries. Asian countries and regions including
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan spend only 11 to 17 percent of total public
education expenditures on higher education (World Bank, 1997). Unlike Japan, the
United States, and many other countries, China has not sufficiently utilized private
9 of 19
resources to support public higher education. Though booming in 1990s, private higher
education in China is still under strict governmental control and scrutiny. The reasons
for this practice stem from the government's political and ideological considerations, the
profit orientations and the low quality of education in private colleges and universities. 
In 1990, public spending per student in higher education was 193 percent of GDP per
capita. Public spending per student in secondary education was 15 percent, and in
primary education was five percent. In 1994, public spending in higher education was
175 percent, still considerably higher than the average of 98 percent in East Asia (World
Bank, 1997, pp. 41-42). In other countries in East Asia and the United States with mass
higher education, the large sizes of enrollments and efficient utilization of resources
result in the economies of scale and reduced unit costs. 
Table 3
Financing Sources: Public Allocation from Governments and Revenue
Generation in Institutions
Sources: 1978 1988 1990 1992
1. Total Budgeted Allocation 95.9% 87.7% 86.9% 81.8%
        Recurrent Expenditure 74.8 64.9 65.3 61.4
        Capital Expenditure 21.1 22.9 21.6 20.4
2. Total Institution-Generated Revenues 4.1 12.3 13.1 18.2
        Total of 2.1 and 2.2 4.1 10.5 11.4 13.6
        2.1 Revenues from institution funded activities  10.3 10.7 12.8
                From institution-affiliated enterprises  2.8 3.1 3.7
                From commissioned training  2.1 1.9 2.3
                From education services  0.9 1.1 1.1
                From commissioned research and
consulting  1.0 1.2 1.3
                From other funded activities  2.7 3.0 3.7
        2.2 Donations and Gifts  0.2 0.7 0.8
        2.3 Student tuition and fees  1.8 2.9 4.6
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Note. From Chen Liangkun (1994) in (World Bank, 1997), p. 46, with the writer's
modification. The published data for most recent years are not available.
Under the centralized command plan system before the reform started, higher education
institutions were exclusively financed through governmental appropriation according to
budgetary planning. The previous year's allocation was used as basis for the next year's
allocation, with possible incremental adjustment according to the situations of the
institution and the whole sector. Unused funds, if any, had to be returned to governments
by institutions at the end of the year. The centralized, tightly controlled budgetary system
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did not provide incentives and initiatives for efficient utilization of funds and
institutional efficiency improvements. 
The higher education financing system has been restructured through educational
reforms. The major financing restructures include the following. First, along with
decentralization in administration and management, decentralization in financing has
been achieved. The central government delegated financing responsibilities to provinces
and central ministries to finance institutions. Second, institutional autonomy and a
simple formula-based approach (i.e., head-count of enrollment) were introduced in
funding institutions. The institutions are given autonomy in spending money, and the
governance authorities exercise the supervisory functions to hold institutions
accountable in addition to overseeing their political correctness. The institutions are not
required to return the unused funds at the end of the budgetary year. Third, financing is
diversified in order to mobilize resources. The institutions are encouraged to generate
and mobilize resources in any possible way.
As for diversification in financing, generally the following principal sources of financial
resources have been tapped and expanded: (a) Institution-affiliated economies such as
enterprises and companies, which accounted for 3.7 percent or more of total higher
education revenue in 1992 and beyond. It is the largest share of the generated revenues
(Table 3). (b) Commissioned training for companies, which accounted for 2.3 percent of
total higher education revenue in 1992. (c) Research and consulting services, which
accounted for 1.3 percent of total revenue in 1992. (d) Donations and gifts, which
accounted for only 0.8 percent of total revenue in 1992 compared with zero in 1978. (e)
Tuition and fees, which account for an increasingly large portion of revenues since 1996,
though published official statistics are unavailable.
Again, there exist different types of inequalities. Inequalities exist between institutions
in cosmopolitan areas and small cities, between market-oriented and traditional
departments, between liberal arts institutions and institutions of engineering and
business, and between key institutions of large alumni and new local institutions with
little bases for attracting donations and gifts. In addition, the enthusiastic pursuit of
revenues in many institutions has resulted in the phenomenon of "running schools,
running business," and negatively affected learning, teaching, and research (Kwong,
1997). 
Special mention should be made of tuition and fees. Before 1978, college students paid
no fees and were assigned jobs upon graduation. The 1985 education reform allowed
institutions to admit students outside state plan but sponsored by enterprises or
self-financed. Institutions have charged a low level of fees to students under the state
plan since 1989. In 1992, students in the state plan were charged an annual tuition fee of
300-600 RMB, or $36-72 USD, and room and board of 100-200 RMB, or $12-24 USD.
There are regional and sub-sector disparities in fee levels. In 1994, the distinction in fee
level among students under the state plan, enterprise-financed students and self-financed
students was abolished. In 1995, the tuition fees for students in most institutions were
about 1,300 RMB, or $157 USD per student per academic year. Some institutions could
charge more but were ordered not to exceed 2,700 RMB, or $324 USD (World Bank,
1997). Students in teachers' institutions were exempted from tuition fees because of the
chronic shortage of teachers. In 1996, the MOE required all public regular institutions to
charge tuition and fees. The MOE fixed the price of tuition in regular programs at 1,200
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RMB, or $145 USD per student per academic year, with 10 percent adjustment by local
higher education authorities based on local economic conditions (CEY Editorial Board,
1998). According to visiting professors from five Chinese universities at the University
of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign that I have interviewed, tuition at their universities was
in the range of 2,700-3,100 RMB per student in 1999-2000 academic year, far exceeding
the MOE regulated prices. 
Tuition and fees were the very important components of private participation in
investment in higher education. However, sufficient and diverse financial aid, in
particular the financial mechanisms to adequately take care of students from poor
families, were not available. The poor would be denied higher education opportunities
because of their inability to pay the growing tuition and fees. Because of the imperfect
market, it is very difficult for the poor to borrow money to invest in higher education. 
A new student loan program was launched by the MOE, the Ministry of Finance, and the
People's Bank of China with the endorsement of the State Council (Guangming Daily,
1999a). It was reported that in September 1999, the Commercial Bank of China would
provide loans to college students with the subsidy of five percent interest from the
government. My interviews with visiting professors from the five universities revealed
that this program had not been implemented at their universities in early spring 2000.
They responded that a few banks under the encouragement of local governments did try
to make loans to students from poor families, but in very small amounts, usually several
hundreds of RMB. What was worse, banks required borrowers to pay the loans before
their graduation for fear that lenders could not reach borrowers after their graduation.
New "Great Leap Forward" in Higher Education
According to the Chronicle of Higher Education, in July 1999, MOE officials and the
State Development Planning Commission announced that China's public regular
colleges and universities would be allowed to enroll a total of 1.53 million new students,
or 331,000 more than originally planned. The move started in 1999 was another attempt
by the Chinese government to find new ways to revive the slumping economy. As
pointed out, the perceived economic significance of family consumption and investment
in higher education by the central authorities would help facilitate the pursuit of
economies of scale in the higher education sector. But policy-makers' expectations to
help reboot economic growth are the direct driving force for higher education to
radically expand enrollments. 
Calculating that the typical Chinese student spends some 10,000 RMB, or about $1,200
USD each year on tuition, housing, and expenses, it was expected the move would
generate a wave of domestic consumption worth an estimated $400 million USD to the
Chinese economy (Plafker, 1999). In 1999, 450,000 more university freshman students
than the previous year were admitted than originally planned. This constitutes a 44
percent increase over the new enrollment in 1998 (Liaowang News Weekly, 1999, p.33). 
In addition, recruitment to adult higher education institutions increased by 100,000
above the previous year. Some regarded the new enrollments in the whole higher
education sector as the largest increment since 1949 (China Youth Daily, 1999). The
proportion of high school graduates going on to post- secondary education grew from
1.4 per cent in 1978 to 9 per cent in 1997. The figure in 1999 was about 10 per cent,
which the government hoped to gradually increase to 15 per cent by 2010 (Plafker,
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1999). 
The China Education Daily (1999b) reported: "Enrollment in higher education will
further increase next year, MOE has announced that higher education institutions will
recruit 3 million freshmen in the year of 2000, an increase of nearly 10 percent over the
2.8 million admitted in 1999." The numbers of new enrollments in 1999, including the
new enrollments of regular public, adult and private higher education institutions, are
probably larger than previously thought. Many cities and provinces made their own
enrollment expansion plans. For instance, Shanghai has planned to enlarge access to
higher education and to raise the gross enrollment to 40 percent of the age cohort (China 
Education Daily, 1999a), an unprecedented higher education enrollment ratio in Chinese
history.
In my interviews, visiting professors from Chinese universities expressed unanimously
that their universities enrolled more students than expected. Presidents of colleges and
universities, professors, as well as students and parents, were excited about the news of
enrollment expansion. But as higher enrollment quotas were assigned to each institution,
presidents and professors knew there would be difficulties in absorbing the unexpected
increase. One professor from a university in north China said that, to his knowledge, in
the provincial enrollment meeting with the governor and education officials in late
summer 1999, presidents had to agree to enroll the given quota before the conference
could be dismissed.
An MOE official explained that the effect of the increase on the economy is three-fold.
First, the enrollment of more students in universities creates a demand for more
buildings and equipment, which, in turn, will stimulate the development of some
relevant sectors of the economy, such as construction and service industries. Second,
there is a shift of over 300,000 high school students to tertiary education institutions
each year (in the expansion). This will relieve pressure on the employment sector (by
over 300,000 positions) at least for the next three or four years. Third, household money
savings will flow out of the banks as more university students pay their tuition fees
(Asian Times 1999). Obviously, the expanding enrollments is intended to immediately
stimulate consumption and reinvigorate domestic demand. 
Many questions arise about the radical enrollment expansion. First and foremost, is there
any significant empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that radical enrollment
expansion will stimulate economic growth? After careful studies by Professor Wei Xin
(1999) and his research group at Peking University, conservative answers were provided.
On the side of supply of higher education, regular higher education institutions do not
have the potential for expansion to the degree that policy-makers assumed. Nevertheless,
it is almost impossible for the private institutions to expand enrollment under the current
strict control of state regulations and rules. On the side of demand, the ability of the
general public to pay tuition and fees is questionable. The total number of household
bank savings in China with a population of about 1.2 billion reached 5,300 billion RMB,
or about $640 billion USD at the end of 1998. However, the money was not equally
distributed among households. The richest 20 percent of the households owned over half
of the total household income. The Gini coefficient in China increased from 0.288 in
1995 to 0.388 in 1998, and over 0.400 in 1999. What is more important, it is difficult to
expand the capital infrastructure of colleges and universities. If one million more
students are admitted each year and if the MOE institution infrastructure standards are
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followed, a total of 100-300 billion RMB will be needed to invest in infrastructure
construction within the four-year cycle. Currently, it is almost impossible for the
governments to make such a huge investment. If this financial burden is transmitted to
students and families through rising tuition and fees, higher education then becomes
even more unaffordable for the low-income majority.
Second, what about the quality of education after colleges and universities expand their
enrollments, some even beyond their capacities? The visiting professors from China that
I interviewed expressed their concerns by comparing their own tutoring experiences and
the educational achievements of their students before and after the enrollment
expansion. Education authorities also worry about the deteriorating quality of education.
According to China Education Daily (1999c), the Department of Higher Education of 
the MOE has issued a directive to require colleges and universities to ensure the quality
of teaching and learning after the expansion of enrollments in 1999. To improve
teaching and learning is a challenge for all institutions. For instance, specialized colleges
normally offer 2-3 year certificate courses. But with the expansion of higher education in
1999, many 2-3-year colleges that are allowed to offer certificate courses are also
providing bachelors degree courses. Guangming Daily (1999b) warned that this trend
would threaten the quality of education.
Third, what about employment after four years of education? The National Coordination
Workshop for Employment of University Graduates 1999 stated that the employment
situation was not satisfactory in some ways because of the aftermath of the Asian
financial crises and downsizing of governments and state-owned enterprises. MOE
urged the relevant government agencies to offer opportunities to new graduates and it
also asked universities to encourage students to enter non-government organizations and
self- employment enterprises (Southern Daily, May 23, 1999). After three or four years,
when the graduates are ready for employment, can the unemployment pressure be
relieved? Can the economy recover and labor markets be reinvigorated to take in the
large number of college graduates? Without other cautious and compatible prevention
measures, it is possible for Chinese university graduates to repeat the unemployment or
underemployment experienced of higher education graduates in some developing
countries such as Sri Lanka and India.
Conclusion
Large numbers of small institutions are one characteristic of the Chinese higher
education system for over two decades. In addition, Chinese higher education has
relatively low internal and external efficiencies. The low efficiencies are typically
represented by the under-utilization of personnel and physical resources, and
over-specialization and rigidity in instructional programs. Rationalization of
specializations and units within the institution, joint production of neighboring
institutions, institutional merger or consolidation, and increasing the size of institutions
are the four ways for Chinese higher education to help overcome diseconomies of scale
(Tsang & Min, 1993). 
Fortunately, recent trends and practices evidence the following: curb the institutional
multiplication, encourage merger and amalgamation and "co-building," increase
enrollments without growth of institution numbers, rationalize institutional programs
and management, and other types of reform measures. These trends and practices are
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aimed at achieving economies of scale and efficiencies of higher education. 
The new "Great Leap Forward" in higher education expansion in 1999 and beyond, on
the demand side, satisfies families' strong desire for higher education for their children,
and, indeed, stimulates household consumption of and investment in higher education in
the short run. Yet, such a radical move also brings questions and concerns about its
impact on student achievement and the quality of education, on graduates' employment,
and on economic growth in the long run. Chinese political and educational authorities
should look to both international experiences and domestic educational and
socioeconomic realities in implementing the new "Great Leap Forward" policies, before
it is too late.
Notes
I wish to acknowledge helpful comments from Professor King Alexander of the
Department of Educational Organization and Leadership at the University of
Illinois at Urbana- Champaign, who carefully read the first draft. I wish to thank
the EPAA Editor and anonymous referees for their helpful advice and comments.
In this article, I concentrate my discussion and analysis on mainstream higher
education in China, i.e., regular public higher education. Adult higher education
and private higher education are two other types of higher education. The former
is part-time, aimed at upgrading educational attainment of workers, teachers, and
other groups in the workforce who wish to seek higher education without
interrupting their employment. The latter appeared after the education reform that
was officially initiated in 1985. Though many applauded the appearance and quick
expansion of private education, only 20 private colleges and universities had been
accredited by the central educational authorities as of 1997 (Zhang, 1997). In
2000, there are only 37 non-governmental private colleges and universities that are
authorized to issue associate degrees (China Youth Daily, 2000). The 
development of private higher education cannot maintain its momentum. The
major reason, perhaps, is the lack of governmental subsidies, which leads to
institutional autonomy and independence but, meanwhile, hinders the
communication and cooperation between the policy decision-makers and the
private institutions. Furthermore, the lack of governmental subsidies leads the
private institutions to seek quick investment returns at the expense of satisfactory
and healthy institutional growth.
1.
For these issues, see, for example, K. Lewin, A. Little, H. Xu, and J. Zheng
(1994), J. Henze (1984), pp.93- pp153, M. Tsang & W. Min (1992), and World
Bank (1991; 1996; 1997).
2.
Hayhoe (1993) predicted that the higher education enrollment rate in China would
reach 10 percent at the end of the century. From what was reported by Plafker
(1999), Hayhoe was correct in her prediction. Plafker reported that the total
number of higher education institutions was 1,032 in 1999. Actually, that was the
number of institutions in 1996. In 1999, the number must have been smaller
because of increasing institutional mergers.
3.
For the American higher education system and financing policy shifts, see, for
example, M. Mumpher (1996) and P. M. Callan, and Finney, J. E. (1997).
4.
It should be noted that mission colleges and universities, of which many were
established by American missionaries, experienced most impressive progress and
development between 1910-1937 (Deng, 1997, pp. 67-90). These mission
5.
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institutions meanwhile also stimulated, directly or indirectly, the development of
Chinese national colleges and universities before 1949.
For the "Great Leap Forward" in education, the hyperpoliticized, frenetic, radical,
and unrealistic education expansion movement in 1958, see, for example, J.
Kwong (1979).
6.
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